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INTRODUCTION

With the ending of the Cold War, international lawyers have been
involved in a major debate about the role of the Security Council, and
the United Nations generally, in maintaining global peace and security.
A series of proposals for reforming the Security Council and the collective security system under the U.N. Charter has appeared in the aftermath of the United Nations response to the Gulf crisis, inspired in large
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, The Australian National University. LL.M., University of
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article was written prior to April 1995 and is based on Security Council actions that took
place before that date.
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part by the publication of An Agenda For Peace by Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali in June 1992.' Much of that scholarship celebrates the
revitalization of the Security Council and presents the revitalization of
the Council's ability to respond to threats to international peace and
security as proof of progress toward the goal of securing global harmony and world order.
A second theme to emerge in current international legal scholarship

is the complicated relationship between gender and international law.
Feminist scholars have begun the daunting task of placing issues concerning women on the international legal agenda.3 To date, feminist

1. BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE (1992) [hereinafter BOUTROSThe Secretary-General's 50 page report was prepared in response to the
invitation extended at the conclusion of the first meeting at the level of Heads of State and
Government held by the Security Council in January 1992. Contributions to the legal literature concerning the reform of the Security Council include GARETH EVANS, COOPERATING
FOR PEACE: THE GLOBAL AGENDA FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND (1993); MICHAEL RENNER,
CRITICAL JUNCTURE: THE FUTURE OF PEACEKEEPING (1993); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Beyond
Peacekeeping, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 113 (1992) [hereinafter Boutros-Ghali, Peacekeeping]; David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993); Peter Wilenski, Reforming the United Nations for the PostCold War Era, in WHOSE NEW WORLD ORDER? WHAT ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS? 122
(Mara R. Bustelo & Philip Alston eds., 1991).
2. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note I; Gareth Evans, The New World Order and The United
Nations, in WHOSE NEW WORLD ORDER? WHAT ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS?, supra
note 1, at 1; Abram Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, in LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 3 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991);
Richard L. Gaines, On the Road to a Pax U.N.: Using the Peace Tools at Our Disposal in a
Post-Cold War World, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 543 (1993); Matthew Neuhaus, International Law at the United Nations, PROC. OF SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF ANZSIL 253
(1994); W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1993); David J. Scheffer, Use of Force After the Cold War: Panama, Iraq, and
GHALI, AGENDA].

the New World Order, in Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT v. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 109 (2d ed. 1991); Brian Urquhart, Learning from the Gulf, in WHOSE
NEW WORLD ORDER? WHAT ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS?, supra note 1, at 11.
For legal analyses that are more critical of recent Security Council actions, see MIDDLE
EAST WATCH, NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE
AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1991); Philip Alston, The Security

Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be Learned from the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis and Its
Aftermath, 13 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 107 (1992); David D. Caron, Iraq and the Force of Law:
Why Give a Shield of Immunity?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1991); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993); Ruth Gordon,
United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 519 (1994); Rend Provost, Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United
Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 577 (1992);
Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under International
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1993); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf
Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1991).
3. It should be noted that feminism came somewhat late to international law, an indication perhaps of the resistance of the discipline to critical analyses. For one of the earliest and

most influential indictments of international legal scholarship from a Western feminist
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international lawyers have not played a significant role in debates about

the role of the Security Council, nor has the feminist challenge to international law influenced the international lawyers working on security
issues.4 This article identifies two ways in which feminist analyses can
inform current debates about collective security, and contribute to pro-

posals for reforming the Security Council.
Part I argues that conventional international legal analyses about

Security Council actions do not consider the gender-differentiated effects
of those actions. The universality of male interests is taken for granted
by international lawyers. The first level of analysis thus involves adding

perspective, see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 613 (1991). For analyses of international humanitarian law and international law
concerning the use of force, see Christine Chinkin, A Gendered Perspective to the International Use of Force, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 279 (1992); Judith Gardam, A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 265
(1992).
Other feminist international legal scholarship includes Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-Colonial
Feminism and the Veil: Considering the Differences, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1527 (1992);
Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486 (1990); Annie Bunting, Theorizing Women's Cultural Diversity in
Feminist International Human Rights Strategies, 20 J.L. & Soc'Y 6 (1993); Hilary
Charlesworth, Subversive Trends in the Jurisprudence of International Law, 86 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 125 (1992); Hilary Charlesworth, The Public/PrivateDistinctionand the Right
to Development in International Law, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 190 (1992); Hilary
Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (1993);
Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, The Hunger Trap: Women, Food, and Self-Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262 (1993); Rebecca J. Cook, InternationalProtectionof Women's
Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645 (1992); Karen Engle, International
Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517 (1992);
Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 293 (1993).
4. Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, for example, states that his recent
study of cooperative security for the 1990s and beyond had the following aims:
One of the things we have tried hardest to do in this study ... is to map, at the
outset, the whole terrain. There have been innumerable published studies of particular international peace and security problems, or sets of problems, and of particular
kinds of responses to them by the international community. The literature, of which
we give a sample in the Bibliography, is already enormous and growing monthly
more so. But there have been very few attempts to bring all the different problem
and response elements together into a single coherent picture: on a map-scale, as it
were, that does not obliterate the necessary detail, but at the same time is large
enough to be readily grasped.
EVANS, supra note 1, at 184. Unfortunately, Senator Evans does not refer to the arguments of
feminist theorists of security at any point in his study, nor does he refer at any time to the
security interests of women. The sample of literature given in the Bibliography is striking in
its failure to refer to any of the literature produced by the feminist community on the issue of
world peace and security, a literature which I would suggest is also "already enormous and
growing monthly more so." For a useful corrective to the inadequacies of that Bibliography,
see the "Select Bibliography" in CYNTHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEXUAL POLITICS
AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR 301-17 (1993).
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women in; that is, considering the consequences that Security Council
actions have had for women in Kuwait, Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and the United States. I argue that many women are
in fact rendered less secure by actions authorized by the Security Council in the name of collective security. As a result, women must have a
voice in the decisions about security that are supposedly made, in part,
in their interests.
Second, Part II argues that the assumptions which underlie theories
of collective security limit the capacity of those theories to represent the
security interests of many groups, including most women. Far from
enabling a more secure global environment, the knowledge produced by
international lawyers about disorder and chaos contributes to the creation of a context in which oppressive military and economic actibns in
the name of the Security Council are rendered both plausible and possible.
At both levels of analysis, I suggest that the power relations involved in producing knowledge about collective security operate to
marginalize the security interests of many groups, including most women. The interests of men remain the unquestioned norm of collective
security scholarship. My argument is not that such interests should be
displaced or ignored altogether. Instead, I conclude by suggesting that
the interests of elite men should be returned to their particularity. When
those interests are seen as one set of interests which should be considered in thinking about security, rather than as a false universal, new
visions about the necessary conditions for creating global security might
be possible.
The aim of this article is thus to begin a larger and more inclusive
debate about collective security and the reform of the U.N. security
system. Such a debate is necessary if we want to work toward achieving
"survivable" communities, that is, "communities which are committed to
making the world livable on a daily basis for all its inhabitants."5

I.

THE SILENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

International legal analyses of Security Council actions are largely
silent about the consequences of such actions for women. As a result,
the lessons learned from the history of "successful" actions in the Gulf
and Cambodia, or the "failures" in Somalia or Bosnia, take no account
of the capacity of Security Council actions to render women less secure.
5. Anne S. Runyan, The "State" of Nature: A Garden Unfit for Women and Other Living
Things, in

GENDERED STATES: FEMINIST (RE)vISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

123, 138 (V. Spike Peterson ed., 1992).
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In this Part, I contest the lessons learned by Western international
lawyers about the nature of the conditions of collective security.
First, I compare accounts of women's experiences of Security Council actions with the silence of international lawyers about the consequences of Security Council actions for women. Second, I argue that as
a result of the failure of international law to consider the full consequences of previous Council actions, proposals for reforming the Security
Council are inadequate.
A. The Impact of Security Council Actions on Women
The consequences for women of actions authorized by the Security
Council can be documented fairly readily. Security Council actions,
including military operations and economic sanctions, have influenced
the struggle of women to acquire basic sociopolitical rights, improve
health and survival, secure freedom from rape and sexual harassment,
and establish economic security. Perhaps the clearest examples of genderdifferentiated consequences of such actions concern the growing number
of complaints of rape by peacekeepers, the harsh effects of economic
sanctions on women, and women's status in militarized cultures. As will
be seen, none of these issues are considered in mainstream analyses of
the success or failure of the revitalized Security Council.
1. Rape, Militarized Masculinity, and U.N. Peacekeeping
First, the persistence of complaints made by women alleging that
they have been raped or assaulted by their "protectors" in Bosnia,
.Cambodia, and the Gulf suggests that peacekeepers and peace enforcement forces are no less likely than members of other military forces to
rape and assault civilian women and women soldiers. 6 During the past
four years, reports have continued to surface about rape, sexual harassment and abuse of girls and women by peacekeeping troops.
The stories and silences of women involved directly in the Gulf War,
for example, suggest flaws in the dominant Western representation of the

6. I use the phrase "peace enforcement forces" to refer to those situations where the
Security Council has authorized states to use force to restore international peace and security.
The exact legal basis of the resort to force in the Gulf conflict remains a matter of some
dispute. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64 (1991); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What?
Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence?, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 510 (1991);
Schachter, supra note 2, at 452; Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and
PersianGulf Decision Making, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 518 (1991).
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Gulf War as clean, quick, competent, effective, and successful.7 The U.S.
Army's Criminal Investigation Command has released findings that "[a]t
least 24 U.S. Army servicewomen were raped or sexually assaulted while
serving in the Persian
Gulf region during Operations Desert Shield and
8
Desert Storm."
The Gulf crisis does not provide the only example of the exploitation
and abuse of women by peacekeepers or peace enforcement forces. In
December 1993, Aldo Ajello, the commander of the U.N. mission in
Mozambique, received a letter from the International Save the Children
Alliance, which complained that U.N. military personnel had bought sex
from hundreds of girls, many of whom were orphaned or abandoned
during the war.9 In February 1994, the U.N. issued a report which
concluded that the increase in prostitution generated by the U.N. contingent "has negatively affected the quality of urban public life and apparently generated some ill feeling toward troops in some areas."' 0
Accounts of sexual assault by peacekeepers and of a dramatic increase in prostitution have also emerged from Cambodia. In September
1992, the chief of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), Yasushi Akashi, dismissed complaints about peacekeepers'
conduct at a meeting with aid groups, stating he was not a puritan, and
that "18-year-old, hot-blooded soldiers" have a right to drink, enjoy
themselves, and chase "young, beautiful beings of the opposite sex."" In
a letter responding to these remarks, a group of 165 Cambodian and

7. For examples of representations of the Gulf War in those terms, see ADDRESS BY
SECRETARY-GENERAL JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR, 22 APRIL 1991 AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
BORDEAUX, U.N. Press Release, SG/SM/4560 (24 Apr. 1991), reprinted in WHOSE NEW
WORLD ORDER? WHAT ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS?, supra note 1,at 141, 143 ("the
swift and systematic response of the Security Council to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq");
EVANS, supra note 1, at xi ("the effective collective response to the Gulf crisis"); Evans, supra
note 2, at 2-4 ("we have had with the Gulf War a resounding affirmation and demonstration
of the effectiveness of the principles of collective security"; "there is a particular significance
in the successful international effort to reverse Iraq's aggression: the outcome of the Gulf War
was a triumphant reaffirmation of the UN's collective security role"); Reisman, supra note 2,
at 85 ("the Council ...seems remarkably effective, as was most recently demonstrated by the
expulsion of an aggressor and the liberation of Kuwait. That was a campaign all could
applaud ....); Scheffer, supra note 2, at 126 ("international law was a winner during the
Gulf conflict ... a powerful precedent has been established that should deter at least some of
the aggressive stratagems of lawless rulers").
8. John Lancaster, 24 Women Assaulted on Gulf Duty, WASH. POST, July 21, 1992, at A1;
see also Sex Crimes in Gulf Cited, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1992, at A7.
9. Gayle Kirshenbaum, Who's Watching the Peacekeepers?, Ms., May-June 1994, at 12.
10. Id. There has been little action taken as a result of the findings - at the time, a
number of U.N. soldiers were sent home and a 6 p.m. curfew was imposed on the rest of the
troops. Id. The author of the report, Behrooz Sadry, stated that the goal of the investigation
was never to initiate criminal proceedings. Id.
11. Id.at 13.
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Western women and men alleged that sexual harassment of women
"occur[red] regularly in public restaurants, hotels and bars, banks,
markets, and shops,"' 2 and that there had been a dramatic increase in
prostitution since March 1992, when UNTAC soldiers arrived to enforce
the 1991 Paris Peace Accord.' 3 They stated that while there were 6000
women working as prostitutes in 1991, by 1992 the number had risen to
20,000; and there had also been a sharp rise in child prostitution. 4
There have also been allegations that U.N. personnel in Bosnia
sexually abused women who were being held captive by Serbs. 5 Although the U.N. held an inquiry to investigate the complaints of rape,
Yasushi Akashi, now head of the U.N.'s peacekeeping operation in the
former Yugoslavia, announced in March 1994 that the charges were
baseless and closed the matter.' 6 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has
since appointed an inspector to investigate other charges that
troops were
17
goods.
market
black
in
trading
and
prostitutes
soliciting
2. The Gendered Effects of Economic Sanctions
Second, research conducted by Harvard and U.N. research teams into
conditions in post-war Iraq has shown that the imposition of economic
sanctions, combined with the destruction of Iraq's civilian infrastructure,
has had harsh effects on the people of Iraq in general, and on Iraqi
women as a group. A number of reports have detailed the harsh effects
of sanctions on civilians. A visit by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (F.A.O.) in November 1993 confirmed that the
impact of sanctions had spread throughout the country, affecting civilians
and the government.' 8 The F.A.O. reported a deterioration in household
food security, a shortage of medical supplies, and deterioration of the
overall health situation.' 9

12. See Barbara Crosette, When Peacekeepers Turn Into Troublemakers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

7, 1996, § 4, at 6.
13. Kirshenbaum, supra note 9, at 13.

14. Id. As one report noted, "[o]ne of the biggest U.N. peacekeeping operations in
history -

involving 16,000 troops -

helped to put Cambodia 'on the map' in regard to

trafficking in women ...just as U.S. soldiers had done for Saigon, the Philippines and
Bangkok during the Vietnam war." Id.
15. Roy Gutman, U.N. Forces Accused of Using Serb-Run Brothel, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,

1993, at AI2; U.N. Treachery, Ms., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 16.
16. David B. Ottaway, U.N.: No Major CorruptionAmong Its Force in Bosnia, WASH.

POST, Jan. 28, 1994, at AI9.
17. Kirshenbaum, supra note 9, at 14.
18. Sarah Zaidi, War, Sanctions, and HumanitarianAssistance: The Case of Iraq 1990-1993,
at I MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL 147, 149-52, 154 (1994).
19. Id.
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One study has focused on the effect of sanctions on Iraqi women. In
1991, sociologists and lawyers with the International Study Team compiled a report on the state of women under the sanctions regime, based
on interviews conducted with eighty women throughout Iraq.20 According
to the study, the collapsed Iraqi economy had a severe impact on women.
Eighty percent of women interviewed said their domestic responsibilities
had increased significantly and that they felt overwhelmed by their daily
struggle to provide their children with even basic needs like food and
water. Nearly fifty percent of the women interviewed had depleted all of
their savings due to the fact that rationing and widespread illegal markets
controlled the availability of humanitarian supplies. The situation was
worst for women who did not have assets to sell to pay for food and
other daily needs. 2
Cynthia Enloe has noted that "any configuration of international
relationships can be fashioned by government leaders only if they can
devise ways to harness women's compliance."22 Enloe argues 'that
Saddam Hussein relies on the Iraqi Women's Federation to mobilize
women to "put in place the consumer rationing programmes which will
be the key to the Hussein regime's ability to withstand the UN embargo, '23 while the Security Council wagers that such support will eventually waver. Given the suggestion that women bear much of the burden of

20. See Zaidi, supra note 18, at 153. Zaidi notes that the findings of the International
Study Team were based on fieldwork conducted in Iraq in August and September 1991. The

study, conducted by an international team of 87 researchers, was organized by graduate
students at the Harvard Law School and the Harvard School of Public Health, with members
of the Gulf Peace Team, and funded by UNICEF, the MacArthur Foundation, the John Merck

Fund and Oxfam-UK. Id.
21. Id. at 153. The effects of sanctions have been greatly exacerbated by the consequences
of allied bombing of electrical systems and other infrastructure. A report by Middle East
Watch in November 1991 described the results of the virtual destruction of Iraq's electrical

system by allied bombing:
[T]he cost to the civilian population of these attacks on the electrical system was
severe. Iraq was quickly transformed from a modern, energy-dependent society into,
in the now-famous words of the Ahtissari report, a "pre-industrial age." Shortages
of food due to the U.N. embargo were exacerbated by the lack of refrigeration and
the impairment of Iraq's highly mechanized, irrigation-based agriculture. The

nation's electricity-dependent water-purification and sewage-treatment facilities were
crippled, creating a serious health hazard. Hospitals and clinics were forced to meet

this growing health emergency, and to treat the war wounded, with, at most, erratic
electricity supplied by back-up generators. Vaccines and medicines requiring
refrigeration deteriorated and were difficult to replace. A UNICEF representative in
Iraq noted in late May the "vicious circle" of "poor hygiene, contaminated water
and poor diet," which he said left about 100,000 Iraqi children under one year of
age vulnerable to diarrhea and dehydration.
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 2, at 9-10.
22. ENLOE, supra note 4, at 163.
23. Id. at 169.
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responding to sanctions, and of coping with the results of U.N.-imposed
restrictions on food and medicine, international lawyers must be clear
about why we are targeting and disciplining women by imposing sanctions. To treat the decision to impose sanctions as a decision involving
only the U.N. and recalcitrant governments ignores the role all civilians,
and particularly women, are forced to play in order to survive the consequences -of these decisions.
3. The Remilitarization of U.S. Culture
Third, women and members of minority groups in the United States
have argued that the Gulf War has had major implications for their
political status and security. Their most fundamental concern is that the
popular perception of the Gulf War as clean, quick, and surgical has
entrenched militarism further in U.S. culture. The pattern of media "selfcensorship, combined with government manipulation" meant that, perhaps for most Americans, the war sanitized the state's armed forces,
"showing [war] as a place where honorable men can handle hardship
and deadly technology with competence and aplomb and where women
can take a more active role in defending their country. 24 The Gulf War
provided further legitimation for U.S. militarism, through the construction of the U.S. military as global saviors, or a global police force
defending the "new world order." 25 As a result, the U.S. military may
have "come out of the Gulf War more thoroughly integrated into the
social structure than it has been in the last two centuries. If so, the end
of the Cold War will not mean the end of militarization of women's
lives. 2 6 Indeed, the Gulf War also saw the successful feminization of
the homefront, signified by the yellow ribbons which were worn and
tied around trees, antennas, and buildings throughout the United States
once the bombing started. Both Cynthia Enloe and Lynda Boose have
interpreted the civilian support for "our boys" as a response to the

24. Id. at 191-92. For discussions of media self-censorship, see NOAM CHOMSKY,
DETERRING DEMOCRACY 407-40 (1992); TRIUMPH OF THE IMAGE: THE MEDIA'S WAR IN THE
PERSIAN GULF (Hamid Mowlana et al.eds., 1992).

25. In President Bush's speech to Congress on September 11, 1990, he spoke of a
new world ... struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we've
known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in
which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world
where the strong respect the rights of the weak.
136 CONG. REC. 23,920 (1990). From a feminist perspective, Bush's references to the birth of
a new world, and his construction of "the rule of the jungle" as representing the "state of
nature," deserve far more analysis than I can give them here.
26. ENLOE, supra note 4, at 184.
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imagined figure of the resentful male Vietnam veteran who emerged as
a symbol of besieged masculinity in 1980s America.27
The increasing militarization of U.S. culture and the U.S. economy
is a matter of particular concern for women due to the gender-differentiated effects of war and militarism. Women suffer disproportionately
when there are cutbacks in civilian spending in order to fund increased
spending on the defence budget.28 The continued ban on women in
"combat," itself an unstable category continually being redefined to
ensure that the. military can be adequately staffed without lowering
masculine morale, means that women do not benefit from increased
military spending in the ways that male career militarists do.29 There is
also evidence that violence against women increases in militarized cultures generally and in military families in particular.3 °
Finally, the remilitarization of U.S. culture, and perhaps of many
Western democracies, is also of concern outside those societies. Any
evidence of increased willingness on the part of U.S. citizens to support
militaristic solutions to international conflicts is a matter of grave concern for those in the areas which have suffered at the hands of the U.S.
military during recent decades. 3 1 The closing of the space for alternative
forms of self-representation in U.S. culture impacts not only upon
women in the United States, but upon the security of people all over the
globe. It suggests that the high-violence options which continue to
threaten the security of many are now once again marketable to many
citizens of the United States and other Western democracies. 32

27. Id.; Lynda Boose, Techno-Muscularity and the "Boy Eternal," in CULTURES OF
581 (Amy Kaplan & Donald E. Pease eds., 1993).

UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM

28. Ann Tickner argues that "[w]hen military spending is high and social welfare programs are cut back, women, who are disproportionately clustered at the bottom of the
socioeconomic scale, are usually the first to suffer. Women also assume most of the unremunerated caregiving activities that states relinquish when budgets are tight." J. Ann Tickner,
Inadequate Providers? A Gendered Analysis of States and Security, in THE STATE IN TRANSITION: REIMAGINING POLITICAL SPACE 125, 130 (Joseph A. Camilleri et al., 1995)

29. Cynthia Enloe has argued that feminists need to find a way to argue two things
simultaneously: first, "that the military is too important a social institution to be allowed to
perpetuate sexism for the sake of protecting fragile masculine identities" and second, "that the
military is too important." See Cynthia Enloe, The Right to Fight: A Feminist Catch-22, Ms.,
July-Aug. 1993, at 84, 87.
30. Tickner, supra note 28, at 130.
31. See CHOMSKY, supra note 24 (providing critical analysis of U.S. military intervention
in Central America, Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa).
32. For further development of this argument, see ENLOE, supra note 4, at 161-200;
EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 341-408 (1993); Boose, supra note 27; Susan
Jeffords, The Patriot System, or Managerial Heroism, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES
IMPERIALISM, supra note 27, at 535; Donald E. Pease, Hiroshima, the Vietnam Veterans War

Memorial, and the Gulf War: Post-National Spectacles, in

CULTURES OF UNITED STATES
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4. Mainstream Analyses of International Law
It is clear from the above accounts that Security Council actions have
had, and continue to have, profound implications for the status and
security of women. It is revealing to compare these accounts, largely
available only through the feminist press, alternative media sources, and
in the work of feminist theorists, with mainstream analyses of the success
of operations in the Gulf, Bosnia, Mozambique, and Cambodia. The
gender-differentiated effects of Security Council actions have been
ignored in mainstream international legal analyses of3the success, effectiveness, and desirability of past and future actions.
The Gulf War, for example, is treated by international lawyers
writing in the area of collective security as an important historical event.
Many agree that it represented the revitalization of the Security Council;
the collective security system established under the U.N. Charter finally
achieved its potential after years of effective paralysis through the
reciprocal use of the veto. 34 The military operation in the Gulf is represented as an example of an effective, successful, quick, and clean response by the collective security system to state aggression.3 ' Among the
many contributions by international lawyers to the analysis of the operation in the Gulf, however, very few have considered the effect of that
action on women. 6 The silence of international lawyers about these

IMPERIALISM, supra note 27, at 557; Michael Rogin, "Make my Day! ": Spectacle as Amnesia
in Imperial Politics, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM, supra note 27, at 499.

33. The failure of official reports to refer to women's interests is both remarkable and
extremely troubling. The Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council on Mozambique,
for example, make no reference to the reports of abuse of power by peacekeepers. See Further
Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Operationin Mozambique, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 1002d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/1994/1002 (1994); Report of the Secretary-Generalon the
United Nations Operation in Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 803d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/1994/803 (1994); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in
Mozambique, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 511th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/1994/511 (1994). The failure
of official reports to refer to these allegations suggests a disregard for the concerns and

interests of the women involved. That failure also suggests that the wisdom of sending soldiers
to maintain peace will not be questioned in the short term. Similarly, the Secretary-General's
reports on the situation in Somalia indicate a lack of concern for women's post-conflict role.
See Report by the Secretary-GeneralConcerning the Situation in Somalia, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 1068th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/1994/1068 (1994); Report of the Secretary-General to the

Security Council on Somalia, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 977th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/1994/977
(1994).
34. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 1; Chayes, supra note 2, at 6; Evans, supra note 2, at 2;
Gaines, supra note 2, at 549; Neuhaus, supra note 2, at 253; Reisman, supra note 2, at 85;
Scheffer, supra note 2, at 125-34.
35. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
36. For an analysis that does examine the impact on women, see Judith Gardam, Gender
and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (1993).
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issues seems to indicate that the interests of women are simply seen as
irrelevant. It may be that rape and sexual abuse of women are seen as a
"private issue," even though the decision to send peacekeepers to particular countries is a public issue.37
The official responses by military leaders and U.N. officials to
complaints of increased prostitution, rape, and sexual assault by peacekeepers suggest that abuse and exploitation of women are inevitable.
Fred Eckhard, the associate spokesperson for Secretary-General BoutrosGhali, has argued:
I don't think it's a U.N. problem.... It's a universal problem....
[W]e (U.N. personnel) are pretty much the same as the average
human being .... [[T]here will always be problems.when] you put
large numbers of men together, send them away from home, keep
them in barracks, put them in military maneuvers for a period of
time. You give them a couple of nights off, they tend to look for
company, drink, make a lot of noise, and sometimes get into trouble."8
Eckhard's response illustrates that U.N. officials continue to view the
brutalization of women as something which is not the responsibility of
the U.N. but a "universal problem" caused by the fact that U.N. peacekeepers are, after all, "average human beings." Feminist analyses, on the
other hand, suggest that militarized men are not simply average human
beings, but are men produced in particular ways: through military training, appeals to masculinity, and cultural license toward military brutality
against women and feminized Others. 39 The implications of that training
are revealed in reports of women who suffer rape in war, who work as
prostitutes during wars or near military bases, and in the reports of
women in the military who have suffered rape and sexual harassment. 40

37. Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright have criticized the characterization of violence
against women as a private, domestic issue, and thus outside the province of international law.
See Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 627-29.
38. Quoted in Kirshenbaum, supra note 9, at 10.
39. See, e.g., ENLOE, supra note 4; Enloe, supra note 29; Susan Faludi, The Citadel, NEW
YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 62.
40. The Tailhook scandal in the United States revealed a misogynistic culture among U.S.
military personnel. See ENLOE, supra note 4, at 192, 195-96. Similarly, the Australian Senate
has conducted an investigation into a navy sexual harassment scandal, following the report of
a naval investigation into the issue. The investigation found a culture that "encouraged
misogyny and behavior 'well beyond any standard of common decency.' " Naval Maneuvers,
Ms., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 17, 17. Recent revelations about the experience of Filipinas at the
hands of both Japanese troops during World War II and the United States military at Subic
Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base give some insight into the construction of militarized
masculinity. See Sheila Coronel & Ninotchka Rosca, For the Boys: Filipinas Expose Years of
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Ignoring the complaints made by women means that officials and experts
fail to acknowledge that sending militarized men to maintain peace may
have destructive implications for local men, women, and children.4 ' Both
Eckhard and Akashi dismiss violence against women as normal, universal, and, indeed, understandable.4 2 Through their failure to take action
against those peacekeepers who are abusing their positions of power and
responsibility, U.N. officials such as Akashi and Eckhard act implicitly
to authorize such behavior. If it is true that militarized men inevitably
behave in such a way, surely that would suggest that peacekeeping does
not operate to protect the interests of local people.
The current efficient, effective security system lauded by many
international lawyers is built on the silence of those women and
marginalized groups whose accounts of the consequences of Security
Council actions are currently not being attended to by security
decisionmakers. There is a need to acknowledge that decisions to impose
sanctions or initiate military peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations can have gender-differentiated consequences. At the very least,
consideration of the different effects that the decision to impose economic sanctions or authorize the use of force may have on women should be
built-in as part of the decision-making process. The consequences of
those decisions for women should, in turn, inform the analysis of whether the operations or sanctions have been effective.
B. Proposalsfor Reforming the Collective Security System
The failure of the current collective security system to recognize, let
alone protect, women's security interests, suggests the need for women's
involvement in collective security decisionmaking. Currently, very few
people are able to participate in the process of making decisions about
security issues,43 and there are no mechanisms available which enable

Sexual Slavery by the U.S. and Japan, Ms., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 10. Women's experience of

rape in wartime has become an issue on the international legal agenda as a result of the reports
of the systematic rape of women as a tool of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. See
Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in InternationalLaw, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L.
326 (1994); Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, 87 AM.

J.INT'L L. 424 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994). *
41. For a critique of the current practice of sending military troops to enforce peace from
a peace activist perspective, see Yeshua Moser, U.N. Peacekeeping in Cambodia, ARENA

MAG., Aug.-Sep. 1993, at 26 (1993).
42. See supra notes 11 (Akashi) and 38 (Eckhard) and accompanying text.
43. Michael Reisman notes that "as the Council has become more effective and powerful,

it has become more secretive. Like a parliamentary matryoshka (doll), it now contains ever
smaller 'mini-Councils,' each meeting behind closed doors without keeping records, and each
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individuals to hold those making such decisions to account. 44 Peacekeepers are rarely held accountable for oppressive or criminal acts carried out

during the course of actions authorized by the Security Council. Issues of
democratic participation in decisionmaking, and of the accountability of
the Security Council and peacekeepers, should be on the agenda for
reforming the collective security system.45
Yet, to date, proposals for reform in that area have focused on a
narrow range of issues, all of which are directed at increasing the power
and efficiency of the Council. 46 In particular, international lawyers have
argued that there is a need to develop better methods of financing
peacekeeping forces; 47 for member states to provide standby troops;48 to

taking decisions secretly." Reisman, supra note 2, at 85. Before the Council meets, the P-5 (the
five permanent members) have met in a special room outside the Security Council, and the P-3
(the U.S., the U.K., and France) have met in consultation. Id. at 86. All these meetings are
closed and no minutes are kept. Id. As Reisman suggests, "[d]ecisions that appear to go further
than at any time in the history of the United Nations are now ultimately being taken, it seems,
by a small group of states separately meeting in secret." Id. at 85-86.
44. The issue of whether even the International Court of Justice has competence to review
Council actions taken under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter was left unresolved in the
Lockerbie decision. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.; Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J.
3, 114 (Provisional Measures of Apr. 4). For analyses of whether the Security Council is
outside the control of the rule of law in the wake of the Lockerbie decision, see Thomas M.
Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J.
INT'L L. 643 (1994); Bernhard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court: The
Libyan Case, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 184 (1993); Reisman, supra note 2.
45. For a legal analysis that does address the need for the democratization of international
institutions in the area of collective security, see Gordon, supra note 2.
46. See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 2, at 587. Gaines argues that the U.N. must be able to
"act quickly and proactively to prevent potential conflicts, to intervene, and in emergencies, to
suspend sovereignty." Id. He imagines an executive arm of the U.N., formed by joining the
often-used peacekeeping operations with the rarely-used Chapter VII enforcement provisions,
which could "collectively guide a genuine world order." Id. This group, he states,
would be an executive enforcer of international law and a stabilizer of the new
global marketplace. It would be a peacemaker, peacekeeper, and peace enforcer in
one centralized body. Combining this executive arm with stronger legislative and
judicial branches, the United Nations could finally become the institution of which
the post-World War II founders dreamed.
Id. (citation omitted).
47. See, e.g., Urquhart, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing the need for "[d]ifferent methods
of financing peace-keeping forces - including subventions by large multinational corporations
and other interests that benefit from peace-keeping"); BOUTROS-GiiALI, AGENDA, supra note
1, at 41-44; EVANS, supra note 1, at 174-77; RENNER, supra note 1, at 49-53; Boutros-Ghali,
Peacekeeping, supra note 1, at 120; Gaines, supra note 2, at 580; Wilenski, supra note 1, at
129.
48. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 1, at 163-65; RENNER, supra note 1, at 38; BoutrosGhali, Peacekeeping, supra note 1, at 115; Urquhart, supra note 2, at 19.
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finance a U.N. rapid response force;49 to strengthen logistical support for
peacekeepers; 5° to expand U.N. training of the military forces serving as
peacekeepers; 51 to develop better systems of preventive diplomacy;52 to
increase the presence of U.N. forces in potential trouble spots; 53 to
expand the role of peacekeeping;' to improve the availability of necessary equipment; 55 and to develop mechanisms to
ensure the safety of
56
peacekeepers, peacemakers, and U.N. personnel.
1. Democratic Participation
While decisions to take action in the name of "security" have rarely
been negotiated with those whose security interests will be most immediately and seriously affected by those actions, the failure to consult or
negotiate is particularly marked with respect to women. The failure to
acknowledge the impact of Security Council decisionmaking on women

49. See, e.g., RENNER, supra note 1, at 48; Boutros-Ghali, Peacekeeping, supra note 1, at
120; Urquhart, supra note 2, at 20 (arguing that there is a need for a "UN rapid-response force
on the lines of the SAS or Delta force" to give the Security Council more "practical" means
to deal with "terrorism, hostage-taking, and various forms of international blackmail").
50. See, e.g., Urquhart, supra note 2, at 19; Wilenski, supra note 1, at 130.
51. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Preparingto Wage Peace: Toward the Creation of an
International Peacemaking Command and Staff College, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 77 (1994);
Urquhart, supra note 2, at 19; Wilenski, supra note 1, at 130.
52. See, e.g., BOuTRos-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 13-19; EVANS, supra note 1, at

61-80; RENNER, supra note 1, at 38, 39 (discussing the need for "boundary and ethnic
contingency maps - identifying potential 'hot spots' where borders may be contested or
contending groups may clash. Early warning alerts would then kick into gear the U.N.
machinery for conflict mediation and arbitration"); Boutros-Ghali, Peacekeeping, supra note
1, at 119; Wilenski, supra note 1, at 130.
53. Urquhart argues that:
In places where the danger of conflict is imminent, such as parts of the Middle East
today, the Council should deploy peace-keeping missions to report on the situation
and try to contain it while diplomatic and pacific solutions are being sought. If these
peace-keeping efforts fail, they should have the function of a trip-wire which would
set in motion, after suitable warning, pre-planned enforcement action under Chapter
VII of the Charter.
Urquhart, supra note 2, at 21. See also BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 16-18;
EVANS, supra note 1, at 81-85; RENNER, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing the need for "individ-

uals in the field," airborne monitoring equipment, and a "satellite capability").
54. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 1; Boutros-Ghali, Peacekeeping, supra note 1, at 119.
55. See Boutros-Ghali, Peacekeeping, supra note 1, at 120 (discussing the need for "more
firepower"); Reisman, supra note 51, at 76 (advocating the introduction and use of "some of
the most modern and destructive weapons" in peacemaking); Urquhart, supra note 2, at 20
(arguing that the Military Staff Committee "should now be instructed to embark on an
extensive study of how to convert modern military technology, including the various means of
deterrence, to the needs of an international system of common security in this highly unstable
world"); Wilenski, supra note 1, at 129.
56. BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 39-40; EVANS, supra note 1, at
128-29.
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allows international lawyers to naturalize women's exclusion from
participation in such decisionmaking.
There is, however, a commitment to principles of democratic participation within recent international legal scholarship and decisionmaking
about collective securityY Perhaps the most authoritative statement of
the need to respect the principles of democratic participation in the area
of peace and security is that made by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in
An Agenda for Peace. He points to the need for
[riespect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence
... in communities, within States and within the community of
States.... There is an obvious connection between democratic
practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decisionmaking - and the achievement of true peace and security in any
new and stable political order. -8
Within nations, the Secretary-General suggests, democracy requires
"strong domestic institutions of participation" and the empowerment of
those who are "unorganized" or "marginalized. ''59 Similarly, between
nations, democracy "requires the fullest consultation, participation and
engagement of all states, large and small, in the work of the ... Organization."'
Despite that official commitment to democratic participation, women
continue to be largely excluded from the process of making decisions about
collective security within the U.N. system and are largely unrepresented
in parliaments and other political bodies, both at national and international
levels. 6' The Security Council is a particularly male-dominated body.

57. See BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1; EVANS, supra note 1; Thomas Franck,
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); Louis Henkin,
Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 38-39.
58. BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 10, 34.

59. Id. at 47.
60. Id. at 46-47.
61. In 1993, for example, the average global representation of women in national legislatures
was 10.1%. Meeting of Women Parliamentarians,
73 INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION BULL. 322
(1993). In 1987, there were no women in senior levels of government bureaucracies in 51
countries. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT VIENNA, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND

HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WOMEN INPOLITICS AND DECISION-MAKING INTHE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 62 (1992). Women are clustered at the lower levels of employment in the U.N.
Secretariat. Erica-Irene Daes, Advancement of the Status of Women in the United Nations
Secretariat in an Era of "Human Resources Management" and "Accountability": A New
Beginning?, U.N. GAOR Joint Inspection Unit, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 109, at 3, U.N. Doc.

A/49/176 (1994). States' nominations for positions in the U.N. system are overwhelmingly male.
For a documentation of the absence of women in the U.N. system and an analysis of the

implications of the male domination of U.N. processes, see Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming
the UnitedMen's Club: Feminist Futuresfor the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT' L L. & CONTEMP.

PROBS. 421 (1994).
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Member states of the Security Council are represented on the Council by
their permanent representatives to the U.N., and very few permanent
representatives to the U.N. are women. 62
.,
Women have also been excluded from participation in peacebuilding
and peacemaking processes, and as a result, their political status is far
from guaranteed in post-conflict societies. Women's exclusion from
participation in this area is of particular concern, given the SecretaryGeneral's emphasis in his recent statements on the notion of "postconflict peacebuilding. ''63 In An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali states that the concept of peacebuilding in fact amounts to
"the construction of a new environment."' Once peacemaking and
peacekeeping have achieved their goals, he argues, "only sustained,
cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and
humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation." 65
The status and security of women, however, do not appear to be
pressing economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian problems worth
addressing in the "construction of a new environment." Indeed, the new
political environment constructed by the U.N. in countries such as
Somalia and Kuwait may prove worse for the political status of women
than either the pre-conflict or conflict position.
According to Hibaaq Osman, a Somali human rights activist, women
were the most active community workers during the two years of civil
war in Somalia. 66 Somali women found that their roles were revolutionized by the men's absence or failure to provide for the daily needs of
their families. To compensate, women sold vegetables, grains, and
water; and ran relief agencies and feeding centers; soon becoming the
most powerful landowners in Mogadishu. 67 As order was restored,
however, the views of women, despite their wartime leadership positions, were not solicited in the reconstruction process.68 In fact, women
were completely excluded from involvement in peace negotiations and
in planning for the reconstruction of Somalia.69 Accordingly, the issues
of concern to Somali women, and their visions for the future, were not
addressed through that process conducted under the auspices of the U.N.
62. In 1993, eight out of 184 member states had women as their permanent representatives
at the U.N. Only one state representative on the Security Council was a woman.
63. E.g., BouTRos-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 33.
64. id. at 33.
65. BOUTROS-GHAL1, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 33.
66. Hibaaq I. Osman, Somalia: Will Reconstruction Threaten Women's Progress?, Ms.,
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 12.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id.
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Similarly, for women struggling for political rights in postwar Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, the Gulf War means that they may now "be faced
with patriarchal barriers ... blessed militarily., 70 Despite the strong
Kuwaiti women's suffrage movement, women were not eligible to vote
in the post-Gulf War elections on October 5, 1992 - indeed, only
fourteen percent of Kuwait's 600,000 citizens were eligible to vote.7 '
The systematic exclusion of women as women from the Kuwaiti political process has not been the subject of comment in analyses of the
success of U.N. action in the Gulf, despite the U.N.'s rhetorical commitment to the restoration of72democracy, self-government, and human rights
to the people of Kuwait.
As Osman argues, if any lasting solution is to be found, it is imperative that local participation, including the full participation of women, be
given the highest priority throughout the peacemaking process.7 3 At
present, however, full local participation seems to refer only to the
participation of men. In this respect, international legal discourse about
security bears a disturbing resemblance to colonial politics. The task of
ensuring the right to participatory self-government through international
law is still a largely "homosocial affair," based upon the "tutelary
bonding between white fathers and their (local) male.., apprentices. 74
The apparent tendency of U.N. officials to focus on local men as
natural "apprentices" is exacerbated by the militarization of post-conflict
peacebuilding. In An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General BoutrosGhali suggests that peacebuilding should involve "comprehensive efforts
to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace
and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people., 75 The

70. ENLOE, supra note 4, at 176.
71. Dale Gavlak, Still Suffering Nonsuffrage in "Liberated" Kuwait, Ms., Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 14. Those eligible, were Kuwaiti men over the age of 21 whose Kuwaiti ancestry
predates 1920. Id. Gavlak reports that women activists lobbied parliamentary committees

about the need for women's political participation, held rallies for women's political rights,
and conducted protests outside polling locations. Id. Kuwaiti women also demanded the right
to vote, run for political office, and be judges and prosecutors. Id. They also advocated equal
rights in housing and education as well as full citizenship for the children of Kuwaiti women

married to naturalized Kuwaitis. Id.
72. Philip Alston argues that while human rights rhetoric played an important role in

securing for the allies the support they needed both from their own citizens and from other
U.N. member states during the Gulf War, once the allies had established their military

objectives they paid little more than lip service to human rights. See Alston, supra note 2, at
111.

73. Osman, supra note 66, at 13.
74. Vicente L. Rafael, White Love: Surveillance and Nationalist Resistance in the U.S.
Colonization of the Philippines,in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM, supra note 27,

at 185, 211.
75. BOUTROs-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1,at 32.
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activities he lists as necessary, however, focus principally on the building of a militarily strong state.76
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sees post-conflict peacebuilding as
a way to encourage the parties to a conflict to restore their societies
peacefully. While he recognizes that post-conflict peacebuilding involves
"sustained efforts to identify and support structures to consolidate peace
and create greater trust and well-being among people, 77 it appears that
his agenda is in practice aimed at ensuring the "trust and well-being" of
combatants. The Secretary-General states that peacebuilding measures
"require commercial, cultural, and educational projects which build
bridges between the parties to a conflict. The goal is to forestall a reemergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed
hostilities. 7 8 To the extent that women are prohibited from participating
in combat, the focus is more likely to be on commercial, cultural, and
educational projects designed for the men who participated in the fighting, rather than for those who maintained the commercial, cultural, and
educational life of the community during a conflict.
Accordingly, greater attention needs to be paid to ensure women's
participation in the process of making decisions about security issues. It
is not necessary here to enter into the debate about whether it is possible
for elite men to represent everyone's interests.79 I have argued that, to
date, international lawyers have failed in practice to take into account the
interests of women. While it may be possible in theory for those making
decisions about security to begin to take account of the security interests
of people whose situation is different, that would require the satisfaction
of at least two conditions. First, elite decisionmakers on the Security
Council and elsewhere would have to recognize that their experiences and
interests are not the norm and that other experiences and interests are
equally valid. Second, those decisionmakers would have to be willing to
learn from those who are situated differently about the nature of their

76. Id. The steps which Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggests are necessary to
establish peace are disarming both sides, restoring order, confiscating or destroying weapons,
establishing a well-trained security force, reforming or strengthening government infrastructure, assuring political participation, protecting human rights, and repatriating refugees. Id.
77. Boutros-Ghali, Peacekeeping, supra note 1, at 120.
78. Id.
79. It is perhaps a legacy of imperialism and masculinism that white Western middle-class
men believe they are entitled to "think the world without any preparation." GAYATRI SPIVAK,
OUTSIDE IN THE TEACHING MACHINE 19 (1994). If we acknowledge the limits of our power
to "know" the world, and recognize that we cannot know the world without any effort, we can
begin to rethink learning and knowing as "collective enterprises." Id. The issue then becomes
one of responsibility, in the sense of "proceeding from an awareness of the limits of one's
power." Id. As Spivak notes, our knowledge of the world is always limited, if only because
"one's own inclinations and capacities to learn enough take a larger sample." Id.
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security interests. In the short term, it seems likely that the interests of
different groups would be better represented by allowing the members of
those groups to articulate, theorize, and politicize their own interests.
At the very least, international lawyers should begin to consider what
kinds of structures and processes might better ensure that the interests of
all groups within a state are taken into account when the decision to send
troops or impose sanctions is made. Ideally, women should be represented
on decisionmaking bodies such as the Security Council. Women who are
likely to be affected by a particular decision should be consulted concerning their security needs in the process of deciding about necessary
measures to be taken to maintain peace and security. Women must be
involved in post-conflict peacebuilding, peace maintenance, and peacemaking processes..
2. Accountability
The lack of accountability for the consequences of actions authorized
by the Security Council is one of the most extraordinary features of the
current collective security situation. That lack of accountability extends
beyond the absence of institutional checks on the power of the Security
Council 0 to a failure by many international legal scholars to call the
Security Council to account for the oppressive and violent actions it
authorizes. 8 ' Perhaps most importantly, there are no mechanisms through
which local peoples can be empowered to challenge actions which have
adverse consequences for their own security or status. It seems almost
unnecessary to add that this is not a situation which would be considered
to confer legitimacy on those holding the power to govern were it to exist
within a state. Yet the need to provide means of ensuring the accountability of the Security Council and of peacekeepers to the populations they
are protecting is not mentioned in the recent literature on reforming the
Council.
The current system could be improved in a number of ways. First, a
new code of conduct for peacekeepers could be developed. Such a code
would include clear guidelines on the conduct of U.N. personnel toward
local people, particularly with respect to violence and sexual abuse.
Second, donor countries could be required to give up disciplinary authority over their troops where serious breaches of such a code of conduct are
alleged. Third, individuals should have access to a body which monitors

80. See generally Reisman, supra note 2.
81. But see MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 2; Alston, supra note 2; Gardam, supra note
2; Gordon, supra note 2; Chris af Jochnik & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence:
A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 40 (1994); Provost, supra note 2;

Richardson, supra note 2.
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complaints of sexual abuse and assault by peacekeepers. Finally, and at
the very least, such complaints should be included in reports to the
Security Council. 2
It seems clear that attention must be given to addressing the lack of
accountability that I have outlined. The consequences of Security Council
actions documented by aid groups, activists, women's organizations,
human rights NGOs, medical research teams, and U.N. study teams have
included rape, starvation, torture, increased prostitution, and sexual
exploitation of children. The findings point unequivocally to the need for
the U.N. to take responsibility for the adverse effects of its actions. It is
troubling that the U.N. and those nations providing troops have failed to
investigate fully the widespread reports of the brutalization of local
peoples, nor have they attempted to provide a systematic process by
which such complaints can be heard.
II. UNACCOUNTABLE KNOWLEDGE PRACTICES
Perhaps the most subversive feminist intrusions into the field of
international security are found in the contributions of those scholars who
are developing new theories of security which challenge the dominant
masculinist international law-and-order discourse. Feminists in many
academic disciplines have begun to rebel against playing the role of
"dutiful daughters of reformist goodwill., 83 Rather than simply conducting
empirical research that attempts to document and "add on" women's
experiences to the theoretical frameworks constructed by earlier (male)
scholars, feminists have begun to challenge the theoretical frameworks
themselves.
These feminists have been skeptical of "apparent generalisations
regarding subjectivity which in fact tend to take men's experiences as
human ones. 8 4 They have read "neutral" texts in ways which return to
them their particularity; that is, by reading such texts as texts about men.

82. One possible model for such a body can be-found in the recently established World
Bank Inspection Panel. In 1993, Directors of the World Bank decided to establish an indepen-

dent inspection panel that will have the power to investigate complaints received from private
complainants who allege that they have been directly and adversely affected by the failure of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or the International Development
Association (two members of the World Bank Group) to comply with their operational policies
and procedures. For an analysis of the panel and its status as the "first forum in which private
actors can hold an international organization directly accountable for the consequences of its
failure to follow its own rules and procedures," see Daniel D. Bradlow, InternationalOrganizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L

L. 553, 554 (1994).
83. Rosi BRAIDorI, PATTERNS OF DISSONANCE 209 (Elizabeth Guild trans., 1991).
84. ELIZABETH GROSZ, VOLATILE BODIES 103 (1994).
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Read in this way, texts concerned with the Security Council can provide
useful accounts of the ways in which security for particular groups is
guaranteed. Elizabeth Grosz develops that methodology in these terms:
I have been concerned with the ways in which a corporal "universal" has in fact functioned as a veiled representation and projection
of a masculine which takes itself as the unquestioned norm, the ideal
representative without any idea of the violence that this representational positioning does to its others - women, the "disabled,"
cultural and racial minorities, different classes, homosexuals - who
are reduced to the role of modifications or variations of the (implicitly white, male, youthful, heterosexual, middle-class) human body.
I have attempted to read the male discourses dealt with here as
discourses for and about men, discourses which have ignored or
misunderstood the radical implications of insisting on sexual specificity, discourses which have presented their claims - radical as
these might be - without any understanding of their relevance to
or usefulness for women. 5
It is very important for feminist international lawyers to take this next
step, and to read the discourse of security as a discourse "for and about
men." 6 It is important to comment on the ways in which the interests of
elite men are treated in these texts as "the unquestioned norm."87 Without
doing so, it could still be suggested that while the status or security of
some women may be sacrificed as outlined in Part I in the short term, the
interests of all people will, be guaranteed by the collective security system
in the long term. The argument for protecting the security of states in the
name of peace is, after all, a powerful one; in the words of Louis Henkin,
peace is the "paramount value" under the U.N. Charter, more important
than progress and justice.8 Change must "be achieved peacefully by
international agreement." 89 The Charter reflects the commitment of
member states to the goal of maintaining world order so that international
society can concentrate on meeting better the needs of justice and human
welfare. 90
The revitalization of the Security Council, and the ability of that
body to respond to threats to international peace and security, has been

85. Id. at 188.
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Henkin, supra note 57, at 38.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 38-39.
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seen by many international lawyers as progress toward the goal of global
security. 9' In this Part, however, I will show that the current system of
global security is based upon assumptions that do not address women's
insecurity, and in fact contribute to it. It is not simply that the particular
interests of special groups, such as women, are left out, but that what
currently is presented as a theory of collective security continues merely
to be a theory about securing the interests of collected elites. The accounts of collective security discussed below propose actions which,
while taken in the name of global security and in the interests of a
universal humanity, in fact operate to secure the interests and well-being
of particular limited groups.
A. Protecting the Security of States
Many theories of collective security are based on the assumption that
global security can best be guaranteed by protecting the status quo. As
Rob Walker notes, while we need global security, we "have learned to
think and act only in terms of the security of states. 9 While the concepts of sovereignty and statehood are problematized in international
relations, international law is still premised, largely uncritically, on the
sovereign state system.93 The representatives of states are the principal
decisionmakers in the international arena, and questions of security
revolve around the inviolability of state borders and decisions about
national security interests. The centrality of sovereignty to any legal
94
analysis of global security is seen as appropriate or, at least, inevitable.
The focus on state security is, however, problematic on a number of
levels. First, feminists and political theorists have questioned the assumption that states represent a unified community and have argued that

91. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
92. R.B.J. Walker, Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics, 15 ALTERNATIVES 3 (1990).
93. As Spike Peterson notes, "[g]iven its definitive role in constituting the field of IR, the
state was never so much out ... as simply taken for granted by IR theorists." V. Spike
Peterson, Introduction, in GENDERED STATES, supra note 5, at 2. The sovereign state continues

to be taken for granted by international lawyers.
94. Richard Woolcott provides a representative example:
[N]ational interest and the defence of the integrity of the sovereign State remain the
touchstones of relations between countries. States still give priority to their perceived economic, trade and security interests. Some States participate in what are
called "good international citizen" activities but only to the extent that their national
interests are served and not undermined by such activities.
Richard Woolcott, The Perils of Freedom, WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 22-23, 1995, at 24.
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even democratic states fail to provide for meaningful representation of
women and other marginalized groups.95
Feminist theorists also question the defence of the status quo as a
useful starting point for ensuring women's security. As Peterson notes,
"[f]eminists are by definition and determination critical of status quo
social relations and committed to political transformation .... From
a feminist perspective, national security is "profoundly contradictory for
women." 97 Indeed, the processes for creating a strong state militarily or
economically - such as militarism, capital accumulation, patriotism, or
nationalism - contribute to the material and ideological conditions
which cause women's insecurity.
Many women in states around the world live in insecure conditions,
whether physical safety, economic security, or health are considered as
indicators. The assumption that protecting state security will result in
more secure conditions for citizens fails to account adequately for the
fact that many people live in conditions of insecurity within sovereign
state borders. Indeed, it is the official discourses of security which
contribute to these conditions of insecurity.
Traditionally, these issues have been kept out of international legal
analysis because they are treated as domestic legal, political, and constitutional issues. That split serves to reinforce the illusion that negotiations
between elites from different territorial regions is a legitimate way to
make decisions about security and other international issues. While the
question of legitimacy has emerged recently as an issue in international
law, there is no acknowledgment at present of the critiques of Western
democratic states, which are still treated in international legal texts as the
pinnacle of democratic self-governance. 98

95. There is now a substantial body of critical feminist theory concerned with the
problematic nature of the concepts of rights, democracy, citizenship' and representation. E.g.,
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); MARGARET THORNTON, THE LIBERAL
PROMISE (1990); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1993); IRIS M.
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Anne Orford, Liberty, Equality,

Pornography: The Bodies of Women and Human Rights Discourse, 3 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 72
(1994); Chantal Mouffe, Feminism, Citizenship, and Radical Democratic Politics, in FEMINISTS
THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 369 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
96. Peterson, supra note 93, at 20.

97. V. Spike Peterson, Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking
Feminism Seriously, in GENDERED STATES, supra note 5, at 31, 32.
98. See Franck, supra note 57.
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B. Representations of Internal Security and External Threats
A related assumption is that state borders exist to protect citizens from
the disordered and chaotic world which exists outside those borders. Ann
Tickner suggests that
[h]istorically, the identity of states has been closely tied to their role
as national security providers. Given the assumption that threats are
in the external realm, a sound national security policy demands that
states try to increase their capabilities and enhance their power, the
most important component of which is military power.99
Today, the image of strong impermeable borders is presented in a
nostalgic way in mainstream international relations and international law
texts, where commentators talk of the new and frightening interdependence
of global communities and the fact that we are all less secure because
borders are now perceived as incapable of protecting us from unregulated
flows of refugees, environmental degradation, or nuclear devastation."
Yet for many individuals, the model of safety and unity inside strong
state borders, and anarchy and difference outside, has never represented
reality. The dominant model distracts attention from the conditions of
insecurity which define existence for many groups within Western states,
including women, indigenous peoples, the mentally ill, gay men, lesbians,
and ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. For the members of those
groups, the existence of strong state borders simply does not come close
to guaranteeing security, or even survival. In that sense, it could be said
that many subjects of Western democracies have always been "beyond the
sovereign state."''
More importantly for my analysis, the model itself is implicated in the
form of creation of conditions of insecurity for women and other
marginalized groups, both concretely and ideologically. The focus on
creating a strong state, with increased military and economic power,
contributes to the conditions which create women's insecurity in Western
cultures, and masks the material and ideological conditions which should
be addressed to guarantee women's security.10 2

99. Tickner, supra note 28, at 125.
100. See, e.g., BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 5-7 (describing the changing
context of collective security); EVANS, supra note 1, at 3-8 (describing international security
problems after the Cold War); RENNER, supra note 1, at 7, 8; Urquhart, supra note 2, at 17.
101. Neil MacCormick has written that "beyond the sovereign state is where we are now."
Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1, 18 (1993). I would suggest
that for many people, beyond the sovereign state is where we already were.
102. See Spike Peterson's analysis of the way in which Western states "are implicated in
the reproduction of hierarchies and in the structural violence against which they claim to offer
protection." Peterson, supra note 97, at 51.
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C. Representations of the Naturalness and
Inevitability of State Power
An appeal to "nature" is commonly used as a justification for the
existence or exercise of authority. The argument that a particular hierarchy
or form of authority is natural is, of course, a powerful one, as it serves
to make the status quo seem inevitable and the responsiblity only of a
disembodied and unaccountable "nature." 103
One familiar example of the way in which a representation of the
"state of nature" operates to justify authority is found in Hobbes'
Leviathan."° Hobbes argued that men will return to the "state of nature,"
a state of anarchy, death, and danger, unless they submit to a common
power to which all are in awe. Hobbes' anarchic state of nature operates
as "a sanction, a threat, a discourse of danger," which induces subjects to
accept sovereign control in civil society."5
Today, texts about security reveal the ongoing nature of the relationship between nature, danger, sovereignty, and security. The principal construction which underlies collective security theories is that the natural behavior of states is aggressive, self-interested, and competitive. Pragmatic
international lawyers represent states as naturally ready to use military and
economic force to increase power, territory, or influence unless they are
constrained in some way.1°6
That construction serves to make state aggression seem inevitable. As
a result, the current system of collective security, although unrepresentative and dominated by elite powers, is legitimized. Attempts to
develop more radical theories of security come up against these conservative, common sense accounts of the operation of economic and military
power in international relations. The perceived need to take aggressive
state power into account serves to limit proposals for reforming the
Security Council, whether those proposals are concerned with making the
Security Council more representative, increasing its effectiveness, or
making it more accountable for its decisions. The common sense view is
that the use of military and economic force by states in their own selfinterest is both self-evident and inevitable.

103. See Runyan, supra note 5, at 137-38 (discussing the historical uses of "nature" as
a symbol for the justification of political authority). For a wide-ranging analysis of "what may

count as nature for late industrial century people," see DONNA
1(1989).

HARAWAY,

PRIMATE VISIONS

104. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968).
105. DAVID CAMPBELL, WRITING SECURITY: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE

POLITICS OF IDENTITY 64-65 (1992).

106. One international law text on the subject opens with the words: "Man's readiness to
settle differences by force of arms has been a feature of society since prehistory. Man's attempt
to place rational bounds on the use of force, emerging from his revulsion against the scourge
of war, is almost as old." John T. Swing, Foreword, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at vii.
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The link between security and power is also made in most proposals
for reform of the Security Council. Michael Reisman, for example, argues
that "[s]ecurity, in the final analysis, is not a verbal exercise but the
exercise of power in defence of public order. Without power, security is
a word. The design of a realistic international security system cannot
ignore how power is actually distributed."'' 7 Feminist analyses, on the
other hand, question the naturalness of state power, both internal and
external, by making visible the historical processes involved in the
construction of that power, and the conditions necessary for reproducing
that power. A focus on gender makes clear that existing power relations
are not inevitable. In particular, from a feminist perspective, state power
is not monolithic, but must constantly be produced and reproduced through
complex appeals to patriotism, economic interests, and conceptions of
masculinity and femininity. Only if such appeals are successful in
controlling individual subjects, can states "naturally" exercise their military
and economic power in aggressive external shows of force.
D. Images of Crisis
While images of the "anarchic society" have long haunted the
imagination of international lawyers and political scientists, the picture of
a disordered, 0 8 insecure, 9unstable," 0 anarchic,"' and fragmented" 2 world
107. Reisman, supra note 2, at 97.
108. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 1, at 3 ("it seems the disappearance of the bipolar
strategic balance was only a prelude to new kinds of turbulence and disorder"); Gaines, supra
note 2, at 544, 552 (discussing the "competing forces of order and disorder," and the need to
"implement more fully the order-making tools at the disposal of the United Nations"); Neuhaus,
supra note 2, at 253 (describing the "forces of disorder" in ascendance again since 1991);

Woolcott, supra note 94, at 24 ("The indiscriminate application of the principle of self-determination to any disenchanted ethnic or tribal minority is a recipe for further disorder.").
109. See, e.g., BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1,at 5, 6 ("we have entered a time
of global transition," marked by a "new dimension of insecurity").
110. Urquhart addresses this point:
The world is entering a period of great instability, characterised by long-standing
international rivalries and resentments, intense ethnic and religious turmoil, a vast
flow of arms and military technology, domestic disintegration, poverty and deep
economic inequities, instantaneous communication throughout the world, population
pressures, natural and ecological disasters, the scarcity of vital resources, and huge
movements of population.
Urquhart, supra note 2, at 17
111. See, e.g., Neuhaus, supra note 2, at 256 ("It is our commitment, and that of other
likeminded countries, of resources as well as rhetoric, which will decide whether international
courts, international police, and international law bring international peace to the anarchic
society.").
112. See, e.g., RENNER, supra note 1, at 7 ("[T]he world is being torn by contradictory
trends toward globalization and fragmentation."); id. at 14 ("[T]he post-Cold War era is coming
to be haunted by the specter of violent disintegration of states."); Woolcott, supra note 94 ("the
fragmentation of countries is potentially destructive. It threatens the more orderly, just and stable
world Australia and the international community at large is seeking.").
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repeatedly appears in recent collective security texts as a symbol for the
need to increase surveillance of "Third World" peoples and to justify
intervention in "Third World" states. According to this story, the old order
of stable, sovereign states, U.N. authority, and predictable patterns of Cold
War brinkmanship is in crisis. Security Council actions are presented as
a necessary and desirable means by which to manage and contain the
3
crisis of disorder and fragmentation facing the world."
Those international lawyers who represent the current period in world
history as one of order threatened by chaos again represent only one
perspective: that of those who had a stake in the old order. The story of
ordered stability threatened by chaotic pre- or post-modern anarchy does
not describe the experience of many groups. All those who have been
excluded from full citizenship in Western democracies, for example, such
as women, indigenous peoples, the mentally ill, or refugees, are not in the
process of moving beyond the sovereign state, but were already beyond
it, both materially and symbolically. 1 4 The rational, ruthlessly ordered
world of sovereign states had no place for those portrayed as unruly,
disordered, subversive, primitive, or irrational." 5
The experience of moving "beyond" sovereignty and world order also
fails to take account of the inhabitants of the South, who have yet to
benefit from the security, well-being, and self-determination promised by
Enlightenment doctrines. If anything, the crisis of Western authority has
meant that, perhaps for the first time in history, middle-class white
Western heterosexual men are beginning to experience the world in the
way that other, less privileged groups have experienced modernity all
along - as violent, chaotic, fragmented, and dangerous." 6
International lawyers also present a limited perspective by choosing
to see the changes of the current era as threatening rather than as pro-

113. Each of the texts referred to in footnotes 108 through 112 proposes an increase in the
power of the Security Council as the way to contain the current global crisis of disorder.
114. In a material sense, for example, many people within my own country, such as
Aboriginal people, refugees, or the mentally ill, continue to occupy a shadowy land outside the
full entitlements of citizenship. In terms of representational practices, women, indigenous
peoples, and other marginalized groups have also suffered through being represented as
something Other to the neutral individual of liberal discourses of citizenship. For a further
discussion of citizenship and sovereignty as discourses about identity and exclusion, see Anne
Orford, Citizenship, Sovereignty and Globalisation:Teaching InternationalLaw in the PostSoviet Era, LEGAL EDUC. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
115. For a further development of this argument in the context of Western liberal
democracies, see Orford, supra note 95; Runyan, supra note 5.
116. bell hooks has suggested that "[t]he overall impact of postmodernism is that many
other groups now share with black folks a deep alienation, despair, uncertainty, loss of a sense
of grounding even if it is not informed by shared circumstances." BELL HOOKS, YEARNING:
RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS 27 (1990).

Winter 19961

The Politics of Collective Security

ductive. The fact that old systems or mechanisms - such as the old world
order - are in disarray is "a catastrophe only to the old system."" 7 For
those of us who do not wish, or are unable, to occupy the place of the
sovereign authority of modernity, the new politics emerging from the
chaos of the postmodem era offers the potential for emancipation and for
the finding of voice." 8 That which those in power perceive as "chaos"
may thus offer the potential for emancipation. For many, chaos or
catastrophe in fact enables "growth, opportunity, breaking the boundaries
of a false closure."" 19
It is important to challenge the assumption that we are witnessing a
global transition from order to chaos for two reasons. First, to represent
changes in our understanding of community, identity, and authority as
necessarily threatening and chaotic is to prefigure the use of high-violence
options to manage that chaos. In the post-Soviet era, international lawyers
use images of chaos and catastrophe to signify only threats, such as
ecological destruction, 120 ethnic violence,' 2' religious "turmoil,"' 122 or
refugee flows. 23 That discourse of fear "legitimates increased 'security'
and control, reselling closure as safety against disaster."'' 24 Images of chaos
are used to legitimize coercive military action and economic sanctions in

the name of efficient, humanitarian world order. In that way, simplistic25

military or economic solutions to complex problems, are made possible.
The current focus on surveillance, early warning systems, mediation, and
peacebuilding responses and strategies represents a failure to take account
of the causes of violence and dissent in the South. 26 International security

117. Fiona Mackie, Chaos, ARENA MAG., Oct.-Nov. 1994, at 41, 42 (emphasis added).
118. ANNA YEATMAN, POSTMODERN REVISIONINGS OF THE POLITICAL 17 (1994). Recent
scientific theories also argue that the potential for growth and change is inherent in the state
of chaos. Chaos theory suggests that "order, equilibrium are the rarity and chaos, catastrophe
the more generalizable state ....
the very stuff of living and inert systems; their becoming,
growth, evolution toward increasing complexity." Mackie,.supra note 117, at 41-42.
119. Mackie, supra note 117, at 42.
120. See, e.g., BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1,at 7; Urquhart, supra note 2, at 17.
121. See infra part II.E.
122. See, e.g., BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 6 ("religious, social, cultural
or linguistic strife"); Urquhart, supra note 2, at 17 ("intense ethnic and religious turmoil").
123. See BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 7; EVANS, supra note 1, at 3-16
(discussing, inter alia, "unrestrained population growth," "large-scale refugee flows" and
"unregulated population flows" as threats to security); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 22, 29 (1993) (labelling refugee flows

as "significant threats to peace and security") [hereinafter UNHCR].
124. Mackie, supra note 117, at 42.
125. Rosi BRAIDOTTI ET AL., WOMEN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
MENT: TOWARDS A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS 25 (1994).
126. See sources cited supra notes 52-53.
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experts individualize and pathologize security problems in the "Third
World" and fail to acknowledge that those problems may represent the
exhaustion of consent of dispossessed peoples to economic policies which
ensure a ready supply of cheap labor and resources for Northern corporations and consumers. By professing nostalgia for the ordered times of the
Cold War, international lawyers help pave the way for new and punitive
methods of ordering and disciplining marginalized people.
Second, the suggestion that every human being experiences
postmodernity in the same way, as a period of transition from security and
order to danger and chaos, repeats the violence of assuming that the
experience of elite white men is universal. Without listening to the stories
of other groups, the desire of white men to "manage" this perceived crisis,
and to attempt to recreate a fictitious unity, may prove overwhelming and
dangerous to all those who are outside the white man's fantasy. The panic
that is inspired by the sense that we are suddenly vulnerable to new threats
could be curtailed if international lawyers ceased privileging the "crisis"
of masculinist authority. Instead, international lawyers could move toward
a more optimistic reading of postmodern international relations by
listening to those who see this historical moment as potentially productive.
The strategies of those groups may well be more survivable than the desire
of white men to recreate a fictitious unity.
E. Violence and Difference
Collective security discourse relies on a series of assumptions about
the relationship between violence and difference. Many international
texts concerning security operate to link ethnicity, self-proclaimed
difference, violence, and armed conflict; all presented as a danger to
modernity with the ending of the Cold War. 127 Violence is presented as
127. See, e.g.,
If the Cold-War era was dominated by ideological conflict, the fear is widespread

that the 1990s may be the start of a new era of ethnic violence that will uproot
additional millions of people from their homes .... Supposedly ancient hatreds, to
which many people attribute the savagery of ethnic conflicts, can be reinvented,
revived or kept from dying a natural death by opportunists who see in them a vehicle
for personal or political profit.
UNHCR, supra note 123, at 22. See also BOUTROS-GHALI, AGENDA, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing
that while associations of states are finding ways to deepen cooperation, "fierce new assertions
of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal
ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife"); EVANS, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the
"increasingly strident voicing of competitive ethno-nationalist grievances and aspirations" as
a threat to security); RENNER, supra note 1, at 6 ("long-suppressed ethnic antagonisms, suddenly
unleashed, are threatening the violent disintegration of states"); id. at 14 ("the post-Cold War
era is coming to be haunted by the specter of violent disintegration of states"); Gaines, supra
note 2, at 543 (arguing that with the end of the Cold War, "[o]ld alliances have broken,
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the inevitable partner of any attempt to assert difference within sovereign state boundaries. 2 '
. The stories of international lawyers play a part in constructing our
knowledge about the dangerousness of groups who assert their difference
within, or against, any unified sovereign state. The repeated representation
of difference and identity politics as violent and divisive has implications
both domestically and internationally.
First, the linking of difference and violence operates to discipline
citizens of Western democracies by suggesting to us that we should fear
and repress any attempts to unsettle the unity of our sovereign state. 129
Telling stories about violence and Otherness enables us to "privileg[e]
their presumed coherences within ... ,'" The equation of any selfproclaimed difference with violence operates to constrain liberatory
movements operating within Western democracies, such as the women's
movement or civil rights movements. Internal claims for self-determination, claims that inhabitants of a state may owe loyalty to groups within
the state, or even the simple claim that one's political identity may not
be first and foremost as "citizen," are rendered suspect. The linking of
self-proclaimed difference and self-sufficiency with violence and totalitarianism serves to make domestic political struggles for recognition
more difficult, and the desire for self-determination almost unspeakable.
Within the context created by such representations, "multicultural difference becomes synonymous with violence ....""' As a consequence,

sovereign countries have split apart, and ethnic tensions have inflamed"); Urquhart, supra note
2, at 17; Woolcott, supra note 94 ("More than a third of the 185 member-States of the United
Nations are threatened by rebel movements, dissident ethnic groups, religious fundamentalism,
terrorism, cults or governments in exile.").
128. Woolcott, supra note 94, at 24 ("In present circumstances, countries, especially
developing ones, will strongly resist fragmentation and the efforts of minorities to break
away.... Attempted fragmentation has often led to civil war and occasionally to external
intervention which has usually resulted in bloodshed and the diversion of human and financial
resources.").
129. For example, Woolcott states:
How can the issue of self-determination and possible fragmentation affect Australia?
...If we accept that a particular social or ethnic group with its own traditions has
a right to self-determination, then it could also be argued that the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander communities, particularly the latter, have this right ....There
is also a danger in a multicultural society that the tolerance and cooperation needed
to maintain social stability could be disrupted if external ethnic or political feuds are
transplanted to these shores by groups who have found new homes here.
Woolcott, supra note 94, at 24.
130. R.B.J. Walker, From International Relations to World Politics, in THE STATE IN
TRANSITION, supra note 28, at 21, 35.
131. Suvendrini Perera & Joseph Pugliese, Subject Positions, ARENA MAG., Aug.-Sept.
1994, at 38, 39.
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the "fearful spectre 132
of violent fragmentation" haunts any debate about
difference.
cultural
These representations also operate to manufacture our consent to the
use of force against the inhabitants of the South.'33 If ethnic violence and
postmodern tribalism are understood as major threats to peace and
security, it makes sense to use military force to bring democracy, order,
and human rights to the people of the South, even if some of them die or
suffer harm in the process. Collective security texts create a context of fear
of disorder, difference, and tribalism, in which increased military aid
economic intervention in the affairs of developing states is legitimized to
create a ruthlessly "ordered" world.
The focus on self-proclaimed difference and ethnic violence as major
threats to security, and the causes of political unrest in the South, operates
to depoliticize global networks of exploitation and oppression. There is
little reference in most security texts to the interest that investors have in
ensuring secure and stable environments,' 34 to the relationship between the
political crises in the South over the last decade and the new flexibility
of "transnational capital,"' 135 to structural adjustment riots, or to the U.S.
funding of non-democratic but pro-foreign investment regimes.' 36 Instead,
we tell each other that military and economic coercion is in the interests
of the inhabitants of the South, and for the greater good of securing world
order. The consequences of the idea that military intervention in the South
is conducted in the interests of world order resemble the consequences of
the belief in a "civilizing mission" in the era of classical colonialism. As
Said argues, "[t]he power to conquer territory is only in part a matter of

132. Id. at 39.
133. For further development of the argument that the media and academics play a role
in the manufacturing of the consent of the citizens of Western democracies to oppressive actions
taken in the name of their state, see EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING
CONSENT (1988); SAID, supra note 32.
134. One exception is Gaines:
A financially stable, effective U.N. regime is needed, one that can keep the peace
in a global marketplace where stability would lead to increased economic growth.
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physical force: there is the strong moral and intellectual component
making the conquest itself secondary to an idea... . Through the idea
that Security Council actions protect the world from the threat of ethnic
violence, fragmentation, and tribalism, new forms of coercion and
exploitation are made palatable to many citizens of the North.
These representations also serve to bolster faith in the unitary, Western
democratic state in the face of unprecedented challenges to its claim to
"resolve the relation between unity and diversity . . . ,,13'
The West is
fascinated with the consequences of the disintegration of the former
Yugoslavia, for example, partly because it reinforces the idea that the
West is free from such violence and difference, at a time when Western
democracy shows increasing signs of decay and corruption.'3 9 By focusing
on "ethnic nationalism" or "tribalism" as a cause of conflict, international
lawyers are able to produce an outside to the ordered world of modernity.
As Anthony Elliott argues, Western institutional agencies have been able
to interpret the Bosnian conflict "as something Other to the democratic
principles of the developed capitalist order.""
Feminist theory offers alternatives to the evil twins of democratic
unity and separatist violence. Anne Runyan has argued that rather than
"replicating yet again the modern state's repeated attempts to submerge
that otherness, that particularity, that dissent, by mastery or assimilation
in the name of unity and harmony," a more just politics must be based
on tolerance for difference and dissent.' 4'Feminist theory is a rich source
of alternative visions in the quest to construct and enact difference and
multiplicity as positive values, rather than as justifications for oppression
and violence. Feminist theorists such as Donna Haraway and Rosi
Braidotti are also engaged in a risky and generous search for a redefinition
of the community bond.142 International lawyers need to rethink sovereignty, political identity, and security in ways that draw on feminist attempts
to value difference while redefining community.
F. Situating Knowledge About Collective Security
The stories told by experts about collective security offer citizens of
the North "a self-forgetting delight in the use of power - the power to
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observe, rule, hold, and profit from distant territories and people."' 4 3 In
particular, as international lawyers, we are offered the roles of experts and
managers of global "development," we make policy about security, we
"know" about distant people, we enjoy local spectacles about distant
territories. Through that process, we risk forgetting our selves, forgetting
the power through which we are produced as global experts, bureaucrats
and managers.
Despite frequent references to global security, to humanity, and to
universal values and truths, Northern international lawyers are not yet
engaged in cooperation or dialogue with those we claim to be securing
or protecting. Many international lawyers writing about collective security
continue to tell each other about "them," without stopping to listen to what
"they" have to say about "their" security interests. Perhaps much of
international law is better understood as gossip, rather than as a conversation or dialogue. Writing about anthropology as a "nativist discourse,"
Trinh T. Minh-ha has said:
Anthropology is finally better defined as "gossip" (we speak together
about others) than as "conversation" (we discuss a question) ....
Scientific gossip takes place under relatively intimate conditions and
mostly without witnesses; hence the gossipers' need to act in
solidarity, leaning on and referring to each other for more credibility.
... This is how gossip manages to mingle with science, and,
reciprocally, "when knowledge, when science speaks, I sometimes
come to the point of hearing its discourse as the sound of a gossip
which describes and disparages lightly, coldly, and objectively what
I love: which speaks of what I love: which speaks of what I love
according to truth." Gossip's pretensions to truth remain however
very peculiar. The kind of truth it claims to disclose is a confidential
truth that requires commitment from both the speaker and the
listener. He who lends an ear to gossip already accepts44 either
sympathizing with or being an accomplice of the gossiper.
Many security theorists invite us to lend an ear to gossip. Scholarship
about collective security provides evidence of a "broken dialogue"
between North and South. 145 The stories of gossips may be useful, they
may even be true, but telling these stories in this way preempts and
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Winter 1996]

The Politics of Collective Security

forecloses the telling of more optimistic and ethical stories. It is important that international lawyers ensure collective security discourse develops as a democratic and participatory dialogue, rather than as gossip.
Feminist theorists provide useful strategies for developing alliances
and strengthening networks of solidarity in ways that acknowledge the
particularity of ways of knowing. Indeed, "self-conscious reflection" on
engagement with the social is a major feature of feminist theories. "6The
commitment to situated, accountable knowledge practices is the difference that feminism makes. Many feminist theorists have refused the notion of one right access to truth, knowledge, and progress. 47 Donna
Haraway, in particular, usefully contests the notion of objectivity which
structures Western knowledge practices. She critiques the illusion or
"god-trick" of "infinite vision" involved in the doctrine of objectivity,
describing it as a "false vision promising transcendence of all limits and
all responsibility."' 148 Haraway does not, however, seek to reject altogether the doctrine of objectivity, in a slide into relativism. Instead, she
seeks to reconceptualize feminist objectivity as a function of situatedness
or partiality.
Haraway's reconceptualization focuses on partial perspectives and
situated knowledges as the conditions for objectivity. Her argument is
that "objectivity is not about transcendence, but about accepting the local
nature of all standpoints, therefore recognising the priority of partial
perspectives over global theorizations."'' 49 Haraway argues that we need
to take responsibility "for what we learn how to see."'" All vision and
knowledge is situated, and to be situated implies responsibility. Haraway
makes it "impossible for synthetic global theories to reappear in feminism,"'1 5 1 or in international law. Rather, her approach enables new forms
of connection and community. "We do not seek partiality for its own
sake, but for the sake of the connections and unexpected openings
situated knowledges make possible. The only way to find a larger vision
is to be somewhere in particular."' 52 As international lawyers writing in
the area of collective security, we must find ways to situate ourselves
and to enter into dialogue with those situated differently, if we want to
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develop more ethical, accountable, and, ultimately, survivable knowledge
practices.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this article, I have argued that current theories of collective security take the interests of elite men as the unquestioned norm. We
need now to begin to develop a collective security system which takes
into account a broader range of interests than those currently represented
by the Security Council. I suggested, in Part I, that we could start by
paying attention to the impact that Security Council actions have on
other groups, particularly women.
This article has also drawn on work from both within and outside the
boundaries of international law to unsettle assumptions about sovereignty,
nature, chaos, difference, and power which underlie collective security
scholarship. I hope, in doing so, to have initiated a more inclusive debate
about the necessary conditions for achieving survivable communities, one
that takes into account the interests of women. Mainstream international
lawyers should recognize that there is something to be learnt from
feminist scholars. This article is in part a call for a new commitment to
dialogue among scholars in the disciplines of international law and
international relations:
The time has come ... for those who purport to update a field
to do some serious home-work in feminist theory instead of deferring this task to some future time. To defer is to take refuge in a
nostalgia that upholds the words of "men" and relegates the words
of "women" to the after hours of academic work, to a hobby one
never gets to. It will no longer do to say that one is not adequately
acquainted with feminist scholarship. The literature is there to be
read like every other strand of IR thinking, and it is unprofessional
to think that one need not read it to do good research. The time has
come to recognise "women" and feminists
by naming us rather than
53
by winking at us as we walk by.'
It is necessary for international lawyers writing about security to acknowledge the complexity of issues of representation and identity, and to
take responsibility for the knowledge we produce and the stories we tell.
More particularly, we need to be skeptical of appeals to the fear of
particularity and chaos, and interrogate the dominant stories that equate
self-proclaimed difference with violence and division. The emphasis
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which feminist theorists place on difference, far from being anarchical or
nihilistic, lays new ground for negotiating interconnections and alliances
among differently situated individuals.
In short, progressive international lawyers need to have the flexibility
both to work within existing structures and processes of international
law, while at the same time acting to disturb the categories and assumptions that support the existence of those structures and processes. I
believe that those who are positioned to find voice in the postmodern
moment are well placed to do just that.,

